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Abraham Lincoln was a fatalist. That, at least, was what he told many people over the course of his life. "I have
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one way or the other, from which there was no appeal." Even Mary Todd Lincoln acknowledged that her
husband had been guided by the conviction that "what is to be will be, and no cares of ours can arrest nor
reverse the decree." What this meant in practical terms, as Herndon discovered, was that Lincoln believed that
"there was no freedom of the will," that "men had no free choice": "Things were to be, and they came,
irresistibly came, doomed to come; men were made as they are made by superior conditions over which they
had no control; the fates settled things as by the doom of the powers, and laws, universal, absolute, and eternal,
ruled the universe of matter and mind.... [Man] is simply a simple tool, a mere cog in the wheel, a part, a small
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Abraham Lincoln and the 
Doctrine of Necessity 
ALLEN C. GUELZO 
Abraham Lincoln was a fatalist. That, at least, was what he told 
many people over the course of his life. "I have all my life been a 
fatalist," Lincoln informed his Illinois congressional ally, Isaac Ar 
nold. "Mr. Lincoln was a fatalist," remembered Henry Clay Whit 
ney, one of his Springfield law clerks, "he believed ... that the uni 
verse is governed by one uniform, unbroken, primordial law." His 
Springfield law partner William Henry Herndon, likewise, affirmed 
that Lincoln "believed in predestination, foreordination, that all 
things were fixed, doomed one way or the other, from which there 
was no 
appeal." Even Mary Todd Lincoln acknowledged that her 
husband had been guided by the conviction that "what is to be will 
be, and no cares of ours can arrest nor reverse the decree."1 What 
this meant in practical terms, as Herndon discovered, was that Lin 
coln believed that "there was no freedom of the will," that "men 
had no free choice": 
Things were to be, and they came, irresistibly came, doomed 
to come; men were made as they are made by superior condi 
tions over which they had no control; the fates settled things 
as by the doom of the powers, and laws, universal, absolute, 
and eternal, ruled the universe of matter and mind.... [Man] 
is simply a simple tool, a mere cog in the wheel, a part, a small 
part, of this vast iron machine, that strikes and cuts, grinds and 
mashes, all things, including man, that resist it.2 
1. Isaac Arnold, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (1884; Lincoln: University of Nebras 
ka Press, 1994), 81; Henry Clay Whitney, Life on the Circuit with Lincoln (Boston: Es 
tes and Lauriat, 1892), 267, 276; William H. Herndon to Jesse Weik, Feb. 6, 1887, 
Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 10], #2031-34, Library of Congress; Herndon, 
"Lincoln's Philosophy and Religion," in The Hidden Lincoln from the Letters and Pa 
pers of William H. Herndon, ed. Emmanuel Hertz (New York: Viking, 1938), 406. 
2. Herndon to Weik, Feb. 25,1887, Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 9], #1893 
96. 
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58 Abraham Lincoln and the Doctrine of Necessity 
Little Pigeon Baptist Church. This church was the Thomas Lincoln family's 
place of worship while Abraham Lincoln grew up in Indiana. 
Even as president, Lincoln often described himself as "but an ac 
cidental instrument, temporary, and to serve but for a limited 
time."3 He compared himself over the years to "a piece of floating 
driftwood": even at the height of the Civil War in 1864, he told 
Canadian journalist Josiah Blackburn that he had "drifted into the 
very apex of this great event."4 
This does not strike us as a particularly cheerful or heroic way 
of looking at the world. Of course, fatalism?the idea that all fu 
ture events have a pattern that is preestablished and unchange 
able?did not always show itself negatively in Lincoln, since it 
sometimes seems to have given him the assurance he needed to 
persist in whatever course of action he believed had been thus pre 
ordained. "I feel quite sure that there was not a moment when he 
3. Lincoln, "Reply to Oliver P. Morton at Indianapolis, Indiana," Feb. 11, 1861, 
in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols., ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953-55), 4:194. 
4. William H. Herndon and Jesse W. Weik, Abraham Lincoln: The True Story of a 
Great Life, 20 vols. (New York: D. Appleton, 1917), 1:70; Josiah Blackburn, in Con 
versations With Lincoln, ed. Charles M. Segal (New York: Putnam Press, 1961), 336. 
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despaired of success in putting down the rebellion," Joseph 
Gillespie told Herndon in 1866, "and he came to believe that he 
himself was an instrument foreordained to aid in the accomplish 
ment of this purpose as well as to emancipate the slaves." As far 
back as Lincoln's New Salem days, Herndon told Ward Hill Lam 
on in 1870, Lincoln had been confident "that he would be a great 
man," and Or ville Browning recalled Lincoln's certainty in the 
1850s that he had before him "what he considered some important 
predestined labor or work ... nobler than he was for the time en 
gaged in."5 But more often, Lincoln's fatalism seemed to his friends 
to weigh him down in gloom rather than buoy him up in hope. 
Lincoln's private predictions of greatness were accompanied by 
confessions of powerlessness and passivity. In 1864, anxious over 
his prospects for reelection, he claimed no feeling of having "con 
trolled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me."6 
And those confessions were often tinged with the kind of "fore 
boding of his fate" that led him to put a "somewhat superstitious" 
value on the meaning of dreams and caused him "more than a doz 
en times" to tell Herndon, "I feel as if I shall meet with some terri 
ble end."7 
Accounting for Lincoln's "fatalism" has generally produced an 
uneasy shrug of the shoulders among his interpreters and biogra 
phers.8 For one thing, the term "fatalism" is fairly vague in its con 
notations; and just going as far as I have in describing Lincoln's 
fatalism has drawn a host of related terms and problems onto the 
5. Gillespie to Herndon, Dec. 8, 1866, in Hidden Lincoln, ed. Hertz, 322-23; Mi 
chael Burlingame, The Inner World of Abraham Lincoln (Urbana: University of Illi 
nois Press, 1994), 237, 239. 
6. Lincoln, "To Albert Hodges," Apr. 4,1864, in Collected Works, 7:282. 
7. Herndon to Weik, Feb. 6, 1887, in Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 10], 
#2031-34; see also Herndon to Weik [n.d.], Group 4 [reel 11], #2906. 
8. J. G. Randall led the way in dismissing Lincoln's fatalism as simply a func 
tion of his 
"melancholy"?and therefore impervious to explanation?in Lincoln the 
President: Springfield to Gettysburg (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1945), 2:28, 48; Carl 
Sandburg, in similar fashion, wrote it off as an expression of Lincoln's "mysticism" 
in Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, 4 vols. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939), 3:370 
82, as did one of the early attempts at Lincoln psychobiography, L. Pierce Clark's 
Lincoln: A Psycho-Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), 531-32, 540 
42; Stephen B. Oates deals with it as an expression of Lincoln's depression over 
the deaths, first of Ann Rutledge, and then of William Wallace Lincoln, in With 
Malice toward None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 
29, 293. 
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board.9 Fatalism suggests that all events are controlled by "fate," 
which is to say that they are "determined" or "necessary" (and fa 
talism, in nineteenth-century philosophical discourse usually had 
such pejorative antireligious overtones that "determinism" or "ne 
cessitarianism" became the prevailing philosophical terms of 
choice). But who or what, then, does the determining? During his 
presidency, Lincoln frequently spoke of "an all-wise Providence" 
or "the Divine Being who determines the destinies of nations" as 
the intelligent and self-conscious dictator of human fates, but he 
also told Herndon that "motives"?a significantly more secular 
term?"ruled the man always and everywhere under the sun."10 
And if all events are determined, and everything happens by ne 
cessity, do people really have a free will? Herndon insisted that 
Lincoln did not think so, and so did Henry Whitney, who remem 
bered Lincoln declaring "that we were impelled along in the jour 
ney of life with no freedom of the moral will."11 
This vagueness of definition, in turn, opens doors into other 
questions about Lincoln. The "free will" problem, in its classic 
form, has been a constant feature of Western philosophy from Ar 
istotle onward, but free will took on an added political sharpness 
for Americans in the early republic as they struggled to reconcile 
Jefferson's affirmation that human liberty was a self-evident polit 
ical and metaphysical truth with the need to create a new republi 
can structure of law and responsibility that would ensure order and 
curtail riot, chaos, and disunion.12 "Government and law" in the 
United States, wrote Lincoln's contemporary and admirer, Henry 
9. For surveys of the problem of fatalism and free will, see Vernon K. Bourke, 
The Will in Western Thought: An Historico-Critical Survey (New York: Sheed and Ward, 
1964); Bernard Berofsky, ed., Free Will and Determinism (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966); Sidney Hook, ed., Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science (New 
York: New York University Press, 1958); Maurice Mandelbaum, Purpose and Neces 
sity in Social Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Gary Wat 
son, ed., Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); and Linda Zagzebs 
ki, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991). 
10. Lincoln, "Response to Evangelical Lutherans," May 13, 1862, in Collected 
Works, 5:212-13; Herndon, "Lincoln's Philosophy and Religion," 407-8. 
11. Henry Whitney, A Life of Lincoln, 2 vols., ed. M. M. Miller (New York: Baker 
& Taylor, 1908), 1:105-6. 
12. Jon Pahl, Paradox Lost: Free Will and Political Liberty in American Culture, 1630 
1760 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 163-76; Jay Fliegelman, 
Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution against Patriarchal Authority (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 98-106,169-70. 
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Philip Tappan (the president of the University of Michigan in the 
1850s), are "based upon human freedom," and the direction the 
mind takes in defining "reason and free will" inevitably winds up, 
according to Tappan, affecting "the idea of right and wrong and 
consequently law and responsibility."13 In that atmosphere, Lin 
coln's sharp denial of free will presents a disturbing picture. To see 
the man who urged "work, work, work" as the formula for pro 
fessional success, who lauded the Declaration of Independence as 
his political inspiration, and who gave political freedom to millions 
through the Emancipation Proclamation?to see this man turn and 
disavow any belief in the individual's freedom to choose, or cre 
ate alternatives of choice, at best fosters an image of a mind divid 
ed within itself and at worst whispers an underlying moral cyni 
cism about the meaning of Lincoln's most important deeds. 
All of this metaphysical turning and twisting raises in its wake 
another major problem: where did Lincoln get these ideas about 
fatalism? Herndon alternately blamed Lincoln's fatalism on "his 
early Baptist training," on "a defective physical organization," and 
even on a sort of crude genetic determinism, based on what Lin 
coln suspected was the possibility of his mother's illegitimate 
birth.14 Lincoln himself was sometimes inclined to chalk up his fa 
talism to simple temperament: he told Josiah Grinnell, "You flaxen 
men with broad faces are born with cheer, and don't know a cloud 
from a star. I am of another temperament."15 But accounting for 
Lincoln's fatalism in terms of something as psychologically vague 
as 
"temperament" tempts us to trivialize it; and trivializing the 
mind of Abraham Lincoln was exactly what David Davis and oth 
er Lincoln intimates guaranteed would land anyone foolish enough 
to do so with their backs in a ditch.16 The persistence and depth of 
Lincoln's comments on the subject of free will and determinism are 
too heavy and too complex to have emerged from nothing more 
than the romanticized psychological ills of "melancholy" or "tem 
perament." What is more, Lincoln had easier access to formal in 
tellectual resources in theology, metaphysics, and law for his fa 
talism than Lincoln biographers have usually been interested in 
13. Henry Philip Tappan, "A Course of Moral Philosophy," in Henry Philip Tap 
pan Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
14. Herndon to C. O. Poole, Jan. 5, 1886, Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 
9], #1885; Jesse Weik, The Real Lincoln: A Portrait (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), 
112. 
15. Burlingame, Inner World of Abraham Lincoln, 106. 
16. David Davis, quoted in Weik, Real Lincoln, 129. 
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exploring. Finding that Lincoln had "a little-indulged" inclination 
to philology took both Joseph Gillespie in Springfield and the 
young John Hay in the White House off-guard; we have less ex 
cuse than Gillespie or Hay for finding that Lincoln's fatalism may 
have sprung from an equally recondite taste for problems in nine 
teenth-century American moral philosophy.17 
Herndon is the most important source for analyzing Lincoln's 
fatalism, and much of the significance that this idea held for Lin 
coln can be seen just by how often Herndon referred back to his 
discussions with Lincoln about it in the years Lincoln and Hern 
don shared their Springfield law office. According to Herndon, Lin 
coln "was a fatalist and believed that fatalism ruled the world." 
What Lincoln meant by this, Herndon explained, was that "the 
great leading law of human nature is motive."18 All human action, 
in other words, begins with a reason for that action; and actions 
that occur without seeming reason are just what we are wont to 
call irrational or even insane (and even then, most irrational indi 
viduals imagine that they have "reasons" for what they are doing). 
These reasons for action are what Lincoln called "motives," and 
he was very clear that motives did more than simply provide the 
occasion for action. "Motives moved the man to every voluntary 
act of his life," Lincoln told Herndon.19 During the Civil War, Lin 
coln fastened on the connection between motives and actions in 
order to explain why black soldiers had to have political rights 
guaranteed to them as part of the inducement to enlist. "Negroes, 
like other people, act upon motives," Lincoln explained in terms 
that he plainly thought were axiomatic. "Why should they do any 
thing for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives 
for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive?even the 
promise of freedom."20 
Motives, therefore, ruled (or, if you will, caused) human action, 
and they possessed that power because motives appealed at the 
17. John Hay, quoted in Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries of John Hay, ed. 
Tyler Dennett (1939; Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press, reprint, 1972), 72; 
Gillespie to Herndon, Dec. 8,1866, Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 8]. 
18. Herndon to Weik, Feb. 25, 1887, Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 9], 
#1893-96; Herndon and Weik, Abraham Lincoln, 2:306. 
19. Herndon to Weik, Feb. 25, 1887, Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 9], 
#1893-96. 
20. Lincoln, "To James Conkling," in Collected Works, 4:409. 
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most basic level to human self-interest. "His idea," recalled Hern 
don, "was that all human actions were caused by motives, and at 
the bottom of these motives was self."21 Lincoln evidently had lit 
tle patience with the idea that human behavior could arise spon 
taneously from some inherent human goodness, or even that it 
could be educated to guide its choices by some rule of otherworld 
liness, impartiality, or (to use a favorite nineteenth-century term) 
disinterested benevolence. "At bottom," Herndon told the audienc 
es for his controversial Springfield lectures on Lincoln in 1866, Lin 
coln always expected that "the snaky tongue of human selfishness 
will wag out." 
We often argued the question [Herndon remembered], I tak 
ing the opposite view.... I once contended that man was free 
and could act without a motive. He smiled at my philosophy, 
and answered that it was impossible, because the motive was 
born before the man. ... He defied me to act without motive 
and unselfishly; and when I did the act and told him of it, he 
analyzed and sifted it to the last grain. After he had conclud 
ed, I could not avoid the admission that he had demonstrated 
the absolute selfishness of the entire act.22 
Similarly, Lincoln found no evidence in human behavior that the 
process of choosing or willing could be broken down into stages that 
might soften or divert the attractive power of motives. He did not, 
for instance, believe that willing involved two separate stages, one 
of perception or attraction and then one of cool, quiet deliberation, 
in which we decide whether or not to yield to the motive that has 
attracted us. "He maintained that there was no conscious act of any 
man that was not moved by a motive, first, last, and always," Hern 
don wrote. Thus, "there was no freedom of the will," and "men are 
made by conditions that surround them, that have somewhat exist 
ed for a hundred thousand years or more."23 
21. Herndon, "Analysis of the Character of Abraham Lincoln," Abraham Lincoln 
Quarterly 1 (Sept. 1941): 371-72; Herndon and Weik, Abraham Lincoln, 2:306. 
22. Herndon, "Analysis of the Character of Abraham Lincoln," Abraham Lincoln 
Quarterly 1 (Dec. 1941): 411; Herndon and Weik, Abraham Lincoln, 2:148, 306; for a 
similar description, probably also retailed by Herndon, see Josiah G. Holland, The 
Life of Abraham Lincoln (Springfield, Mass.: Gurdon Bill, 1866), 79. 
23. Herndon to Senator Fowler, Feb. 18, 1886, in Hidden Lincoln, ed. Hertz, 141 
42; Herndon to Weik, Feb. 6,1887, Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 10], #2031 
34. 
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In fact, the self-interested response to motive was so regular and 
predictable that it mounted to the force of law, "continuous and 
unchangeable," and it led Lincoln to reduce a good deal of the va 
riety of human behavior to "a calculation of the law of forces and 
ultimate results."24 The key word in this was "forces," since no 
where in Herndon's description of Lincoln's fatalism is there any 
inference that the causation of human action might be attributed 
to an intelligent causer, to God or divine Providence. "His idea of 
God was a kind of 'Sufficient Cause,'" Herndon told Lamon in 
1870, and it was the simple operation of cause-and-effect, not a 
supreme sovereign creator, that "ruled both matter and mind" for 
Lincoln.25 Similarly, Lincoln seems to have been unconcerned that, 
in attributing all action to a comparatively impersonal cause or force 
rather than a supernatural and reasonable being, he was subvert 
ing a moral sense of right or wrong, or any possibility of attribut 
ing blame or praise for human actions. To the contrary, Lincoln, 
according to Herndon, was inclined by his fatalism to soften or 
excuse what appeared to be the most obvious examples of human 
guilt or responsibility. He "quoted the case of Brutus and Caesar, 
arguing that the former was forced by laws and conditions over 
which he had no control to kill the latter, and vice versa, that the 
latter was specially created to be disposed of by the former."26 
Herndon had a well-known weakness for embroidery and exag 
geration in some of his memories of Lincoln, but it is not likely in 
this case that he was guilty of misrepresentation, since Lincoln him 
self provided one large piece of confirmation for Herndon's de 
scription of his fatalism. This appears, however, in a peculiar place 
in Lincoln's writings?the so-called "Handbill Replying to Charg 
es of Infidelity," which Lincoln printed and distributed during his 
1846 campaign for the seat of the newly created Illinois Seventh 
Congressional District. Lincoln had experienced considerable anx 
iety about this election, first because the Seventh District was the 
only one then in Illinois where a Whig had a clear opportunity of 
winning (and Lincoln had taken no small amount of trouble to per 
suade a potential Whig rival, John J. Hardin, to leave him a clear 
field), and second, because the Democratic nominee for the Sev 
enth District seat, Peter Cartwright, was a popular and brass 
24. Herndon, "Analysis of the Character," Abraham Lincoln Quarterly 1 (Sept. 
1941): 366. 
25. Herndon, quoted in David Herbert Donald, Lincoln's Herndon: A Biography 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 291. 
26. Herndon and Weik, Abraham Lincoln, 2:146. 
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lunged Methodist preacher who would be certain to play his reli 
gious cards for all they were worth.27 Lincoln's own failure to es 
tablish a recognizable religious profile had long been, as he well 
knew, a major political liability: as early as 1837, he was aware that 
his political enemies were asking "an old acquaintance of mine" 
whether "he ever heard Lincoln say he was a deist," and in 1843 
he acknowledged that "because I belonged to no church," he had 
suffered "a tax of a considerable per cent, upon my strength 
throughout the religious community."28 Now, in addition to that 
liability, he was dealing with a representative of one Protestant 
Christian community?the Methodists?for whom free will was a 
nonnegotiable fundamental of religious faith. 
Worried by rumors that Cartwright had instigated a "whisper 
ing campaign" that urged pious Whigs to vote their piety and not 
their politics, Lincoln drew up on July 31,1846, a formal statement 
for inclusion in several central Illinois newspapers. This "handbill" 
has been intensively studied ever since its rediscovery by Harry 
E. Pratt in 1942 in the back files of the Illinois Gazette for its some 
what disingenuous statement of Lincoln's religious preferences: 
that he was not a member of any Christian church, but that he had 
never 
actually denied the truth of Christianity or spoken with "in 
tentional disrespect of religion in general," and that he would never 
himself contemplate supporting any politician who did.29 What is 
usually missed is the central part of the document, where Lincoln 
turns, without any warning, to an explanation of his belief in "the 
'Doctrine of Necessity.'" Lincoln defined this "doctrine" in terms 
very close to those used by Herndon in describing Lincoln's idea 
of motives: "that is, that the human mind is impelled to action, or 
held in rest by some power, over which the mind itself has no con 
trol."30 Presumably, Cartwright must have added (or else Lincoln 
believed that he had added) to his accusation of Lincoln's general 
distaste for churchgoing the charge that Lincoln was guilty of a 
particularly nasty form of "infidelity," the notion that all human 
27. Donald W. Riddle, Lincoln Runs for Congress (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1948), 51, 58; on Lincoln's rivalry with Cartwright, as far back as 
the 1830s, see Robert Bray, "The Power to Hurt: Lincoln's Early Use of Satire and 
Invective," Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association 16 (Winter 1995): 43-50. 
28. Lincoln, "Second Reply to James Adams," Oct. 18, 1837, and "To Martin S. 
Morris," Mar. 26,1843, in Collected Works, 1:106, 320. 
29. See the original republication of this text in "Abraham Lincoln's Religion: 
His Own Statement," Abraham Lincoln Quarterly 2 (Mar. 1942): 1-4. 
30. Lincoln, "Handbill Replying to Charges of Infidelity," in Collected Works, 1:382. 
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conduct is the forced result of natural laws, with the possible im 
plication that Lincoln believed that there was no such thing as right 
or wrong human action, only action compelled by faceless and 
impersonal motives. To a nineteenth-century audience, grilled on 
evangelical Protestant notions of moral responsibility and the nat 
ural-law moralisms of Francis Wayland, Francis Bo wen, Mark Hop 
kins, Eliphalet Nott, Thomas Upham, and Joseph Haven, this was 
negative campaigning at its worst. 
It is important to note, however, that in the "Handbill" Lincoln 
carefully sidestepped the accusation rather than denied it. It is true, 
he conceded, "I have sometimes (with one, two or three, but nev 
er publicly) tried to maintain this argument," but he did not repu 
diate his "Doctrine of Necessity"; to the contrary, he struck back 
at Cartwright by reminding his readers that some form of "this 
same 
opinion" was held by several of the Methodists' rivals among 
"the Christian denominations."31 If Lincoln's 
"necessity" horrified 
Methodists like Cartwright, then by way of reply, Lincoln was in 
directly suggesting that Cartwright's free willism horrified a good 
many righteous Presbyterians and Congregationalists. Likewise, it 
is also important to underscore the basic similarity between Lin 
coln's protestation in the "Handbill" and Herndon's account of his 
discussions with Lincoln on necessity and free will: Lincoln be 
lieved that human choice is caused, and caused in such a way that 
the mind is compelled, without the countervailing power of delib 
eration or free will, to cooperate with the cause. 
This raises the second question about Lincoln's fatalism, concern 
ing the possible sources for this "Doctrine of Necessity," especial 
ly since the rather well-developed vocabulary he deployed in ar 
guing with Herndon and "with one, two or three" others like 
Whitney, Lamon, and Arnold lifts Lincoln's fatalism above the level 
of mere law-office chitchat. Herndon supplied part of the answer 
when he claimed that Lincoln's fatalism stemmed in some measure 
from "his early Baptist training," although he muddled what that 
"training" could have amounted to by identifying Thomas Lincoln 
as a "Free-will Baptist," which would have been the very antithe 
sis of 
"necessity."32 Thomas and Nancy Lincoln, in fact, were mem 
bers in Kentucky of the Little Mount Separate Baptist Church, a 
congregation linked to a rigidly predestinar?an Baptist subgroup; 
Thomas Lincoln declined to join the Pigeon Creek Baptist Church 
in Indiana for seven years until, in 1823, it affiliated with the Sep 
31. Ibid. 
32. Herndon and Weik, Abraham Lincoln, 1:8. 
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arates (Sarah Bush Lincoln was received into membership by the 
Separates on the same day "by experience" and Lincoln's sister, 
Sarah, was admitted to the Separates' fellowship in 1826).33 The 
Separate Baptists, who were also known as the Primitive Baptists 
(and, more colorfully, as the "Anti-Mission" or "Hard-Shell" Bap 
tists) and who amounted to almost 20 percent of all American Bap 
tists by the 1840s, prided themselves on a radical Calvinism that 
had "no Mission Boards for converting the heathen, or for evan 
gelizing the world" since God had already determined "from be 
fore the foundation of the world" who, in his wisdom, he would 
have evangelized and who not.34 The Pigeon Creek Church, for 
example, established as part of its articles of faith that "we believe 
in one god the father, the word & holly gost who haith created all 
things that are created by the word of his power for his pleasure" 
and that "we believe in Election by grace given us in Christ Jesus 
Before the world began & that God Cawls, generates and sanctifies 
all who are made meat [meet] for Glory by his special grace."35 Add 
to this the fact that Thomas Lincoln was "one of the five or six most 
important men" among the Indiana Separates, and it becomes clear 
that, for all effective purposes, Abraham Lincoln's life in Indiana 
was lived in an atmosphere of what William Barton called "a Cal 
vinism that would have out-Calvined Calvin."36 
33. William J. Wolf, The Almost Chosen People: A Study of the Religion of Abraham 
Lincoln (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), 34-37; William E. Barton, The Soul of 
Abraham Lincoln (New York: George H. Doran, 1920), 36-41; J. G. Nicolay and John 
Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History (New York: Century, 1890), 1:32-33; Louis A. War 
ren, Lincoln's Youth: Indiana Years, Seven to Twenty-One, 1816-1830 (New York: Ap 
pleton-Century-Crofts, 1959), 11, 13, 114-15, 206, and "Pigeon Creek Church," in 
Lincoln Lore, no. 661 (Dec. 8,1941); Francis Marion Van Natter, Lincoln's Boyhood: A 
Chronicle of His Indiana Years (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1963), 12. 
34. R. H. Pittman, Biographical History of Primitive or Old School Baptist Ministers 
of the United States (Anderson, In.: Herald Printing Company, 1870), 30; Bertram 
Wyatt-Brown, "The Antimission Movement in the Jacksonian South," Journal of 
Southern History 20 (Nov. 1970): 501-29; M. L. Houser, "Some Religious Influences 
which Surrounded Lincoln," in Lincoln Group Papers: Twelve Addresses Delivered be 
fore the Lincoln Group of Chicago, 2d series (Chicago: J. Henri Ripstra, 1945), 16-20; 
"Primitive Baptists," in Encyclopedia of Southern Baptists (Nashville, Tenn.: Broad 
man Press, 1958), 1114-15; "Primitive or Old School Baptists," in The Baptist Ency 
clopedia, ed. William Cathcart (Philadelphia: n.p., 1883), 77-78. 
35. D. Raymond Taggart, The Faith of Abraham Lincoln (Topeka, Kans.: Service Print 
Shop, 1943), 278. 
36. Ida Tarbell, In the Footsteps of the Lincolns (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1924), 143-44; Charles Garnett Vannest, Lincoln the Hoosier: Abraham Lincoln's Life 
in Indiana (St. Louis, Mo.: Eden Publishing House, 1928), 7-8; William E. Barton, 
The Life of Abraham Lincoln, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1925), 2:460. 
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Abraham Lincoln never became a Baptist, although in the 1846 
congressional campaign his friends noticed that he did not hesi 
tate to point out, in religious self-defense, that "his parents were 
Baptists, and brought him up in the belief of the Baptist religion."37 
But what Barton called "the ultra Calvinism of his boyhood" stayed 
with him, most obviously in the sense that it laid the groundwork 
for his later argument that all events were necessarily predeter 
mined: "Mr. Lincoln seldom said anything on the subject of reli 
gion," recalled Joseph Gillespie in 1882, but the one theological 
opinion Gillespie remembered hearing from him was that he 
"could never reconcile the 
'prescience of Deity with the uncertainty 
of events.'"38 Separate Calvinism also stayed with Lincoln in the 
way that it allowed him, as the case required, to switch rhetorical 
gears between talking about a divinely ordered necessity and a 
cause-and-effect necessity.39 The same Lincoln who in 1846 could 
write about the "Doctrine of Necessity" without any reference to 
supernatural causality could just as easily, less than five years lat 
er, compose a farewell letter to his stepbrother John D. Johnston 
for his dying father, assuring Thomas Lincoln in predestinarian 
terms Thomas would have been much more comfortable with, that 
"He who notes the fall of the sparrow, and numbers the hairs of 
our heads .. . will not forget the dying man, who puts his Trust in 
him."40 A year later, Lincoln eulogized Henry Clay as "a man the 
times have demanded, and such, in the providence of God was giv 
en us."41 And it is well known that during his embattled presiden 
cy, Lincoln's allusions to "the Divine Being who determines the 
destinies of nations," to "an all-wise Providence," and to "Divine 
assistance" without which "all must fail" multiplied.42 He repeat 
edly described himself as nothing more than "a humble instrument 
in the hands of the Almighty" and expanded that on at least one 
occasion to claim that "we are all agents and instruments of Di 
37. Thomas Mostiller to B. F. Irwin, 1874, in Irwin, Lincoln's Religious Belief 
(Springfield, 111.: Privately printed, H. E. Barker, 1919), 7. 
38. Gillespie, quoted in The Lincoln Memorial: Album-Immortelles, ed. Osborn H. 
Oldroyd (New York: G. W. Carleton , 1883), 457. 
39. Barton, Soul of Abraham Lincoln, 271-72; Richard N. Current, The Lincoln No 
body Knows (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), 71. 
40. Lincoln, "To John D. Johnston," Jan. 12,1851, in Collected Works, 2:97. 
41. Lincoln, "Eulogy on Henry Clay," Apr. 6, 1852, in Collected Works, 2:132. 
42. Lincoln, "Response to Evangelical Lutherans," May 13, 1862; "To Baltimore 
Methodists," May 1862; "Annual Message to Congress," Dec. 3,1861; "Remarks to 
Baltimore Presbyterian Synod," Oct. 24,1863; "Remarks to a Delegation of Progres 
sive Friends," June 20, 1862, all in Collected Works, 5:53, 212-13, 215-16, 279, and 
6:535-36. 
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vine Providence."43 Providence, in time, became a term of conve 
nience for Lincoln: without committing him to any specific form 
of theism, it allowed him the psychological comfort of referring all 
events to an unseen control, a control that might also enjoy at least 
some form of recognizability as the God of his parents. 
For these invocations of "Providence" were too oft-repeated and 
too absolute in the powers he ascribed to Providence to be mere 
political window dressing. The purposes of that Providence were, 
as he informed Eliza Gurney in 1864, "perfect and must prevail"? 
meaning that they were completely formed and irresistible. On 
those occasions when Lincoln derived some measure of confidence 
from this he chided those of little faith, like Congressman James 
Wilson and his Iowa delegation in 1862, with the assertion that "my 
faith is greater than yours" because "I also believe He will compel 
us to do right in order that He may do these things, not so much 
because we desire them as that they accord with His plans of deal 
ing with this nation."44 However, when the war news turned di 
sastrous, he frequently surrendered to a sense of helplessness in 
the face of an inscrutable cosmic will. In a private memorandum 
during the dark September of 1862, Lincoln admitted that "the will 
of God prevails," but that God's purpose in doing so was deeply 
puzzling, "something different from the purpose of either party." 
In 1864, he pointed out that "now at the end of three years' strug 
gle the nation's condition is not what either party, or any man de 
vised, or expected" and that "God alone can claim it." More dra 
matically, he "moaned and groaned in anguish" to Pennsylvania 
governor Andrew Curtin, "saying over and over again: 'What has 
God put me in this place for.'"45 Whether or not this meant that 
Lincoln actually believed in a personal God (and Herndon was 
quite explicit in stating that Lincoln did not) or merely that Lin 
coln habitually personalized with the term "God" the gigantic fate 
that he believed relentlessly ruled and judged all human events is 
almost beside the point. What is clear is that, even if we grant Hern 
don's skeptical conclusion that the Johnston letter was "merely a 
message of consolation from a dutiful son to his dying father," or 
43. Lincoln, "Reply to Eliza P. Gurney," Oct. 26,1862; "Address to the New Jer 
sey Senate at Trenton, New Jersey," Feb. 21,1861, in Collected Works, 4:236 and 5:279; 
see also Barton, Soul of Abraham Lincoln, 332. 
44. Lincoln, "To Eliza P. Gurney," Sept. 4, 1864, in Collected Works, 7:535; Wolf, 
Almost Chosen People, 146; see also Lucius E. Crittenden, Recollections of President 
Lincoln and His Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1891), 448-50. 
45. Lincoln, "Meditation on the Divine Will," Sept. 1862, and "To Albert G. Hodg 
es," Apr. 4, 1864, in Collected Works, 5:403-4, and 7:282; Burlingame, Inner World of 
Abraham Lincoln, 105. 
This content downloaded from 138.234.152.108 on Fri, 21 Mar 2014 12:19:35 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
70 Abraham Lincoln and the Doctrine of Necessity 
heed Charles H. Ray's warning to Ward Hill Lamon not to let "Cal 
vinistic theology a chance to claim him as one of its saints and 
martyrs," Lincoln remained gripped throughout his life by the 
same sense of things that the Separate Baptists of his youth 
preached, of a universe whose order eluded human control.46 
These Calvinistic origins and overtones, however, do not go very 
far in explaining the specific shape of Lincoln's fatalism, with its 
intricate vocabulary of motives, necessity, and self-interest, all of 
which were foreign to the discourse of the Separate Baptists. It 
would be easier to trace the subsequent development of this fatal 
ism if we had a clearer idea of what Lincoln was reading once he 
left his father's new farm in Illinois in 1830 and struck out on his 
own. One thing that we do know is that, as early as the mid-1830s, 
Lincoln had repudiated what little he might have earlier embraced 
of Separate Baptist theology beyond that looming sense of "neces 
sity."47 Some of the fuel for that repudiation, according to Hern 
don, came from Lincoln's reading of such provocative arguments 
for deism and 
"infidelity" as Thomas Paine's Age of Reason, Con 
stantin-Fran?ois Volney's Ruins, or, A Survey of the Revolution of 
Empires, and by the mid-1840s, Robert Chambers's proto-Darwinian 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.48 All of these books would 
46. Angle, Herndon's Life of Lincoln, 352-53; Herndon to Weik, Nov. 24,1882, in Hid 
den Lincoln, ed. Hertz, 87; C. H. Ray, quoted in Lamon, The Life of Abraham Lincoln 
from His Birth to His Inauguration as President (Boston: James E. Osgood, 1872), 489 
90. There were, of course, other brands of Calvinism on offer in the early republic 
that might have exercised influence on the young Lincoln. Jonathan Edwards, the 
most formidable of early American Calvinist divines, laid the groundwork for a ma 
jor reconciliation of absolute predestination and a thinly defined version of free will 
in his great treatise on Freedom of the Will (1754), which was easily the most carefully 
read American philosophical work before 1850 and which also described human ac 
tions as a response to "motives." But in Lincoln there is no sign of any reconciliation 
between necessity and free will, or at least nothing resembling Edwards's formulas; 
and nothing in Lincoln's use of the term "motives" that shares any ground with Ed 
wards's (see Allen C. Guelzo, Edwards on the Will: A Century of American Theological 
Debate, 1750-1850 [Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 19891,154-75). 
47. Herndon to Lamon, Feb. 25,1870), in Hidden Lincoln, ed. Hertz, 64-65; Cogdal 
to B. F. Irwin, in Irwin, Lincoln's Religious Belief, 8; Matheny to Lamon, in Lamon, 
Life of Abraham Lincoln, 487-88, 495; Joshua Speed, Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln; 
and a Visit to California (Louisville, Ky: J. P. Morton, 1884), 32-33; Rankin, Personal 
Reccllections of Abraham Lincoln (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916), 324-25. 
48. Angle, Herndon's Life of Lincoln, 347; Herndon, "Lincoln's Philosophy and 
Religion," in Hidden Lincoln, ed. Hertz, 407; John Hill to Herndon, June 6, 1865, 
Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 7], #118; William Elroy Curtis, The True Abra 
ham Lincoln (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1903), 376; Kunigunde Duncan and D. 
F. Nickols, Mentor Graham: The Man Who Taught Lincoln (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1944), 143; Barton, Life of Abraham Lincoln, 2:459; Albert J. Beveridge, 
Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1858, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 1:138-40. 
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have confirmed a basic skepticism about Christian dogma and, if 
Herndon has the story right, Lincoln may have even written an 
essay of his own in the mid-1830s on "infidelity" that "denied the 
miraculous conception of Christ, ridiculed the Trinity, and denied 
that the Bible was the divine special revelation of God."49 Another 
thing, quite incidentally, that all of these would have confirmed 
would have been a thoroughgoing secular determinism. Virtually 
all of the major deistic or "infidel" literature published in Ameri 
ca in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century incorporat 
ed some form of determinism, largely as a way of accounting for 
order in the universe without invoking a personal God to create 
and provide for it. Paine, for instance, mocked predestination as a 
theological doctrine, but he just as quickly described the operation 
of the universe as a "vast machinery" that "still goes on ... whether 
wake or sleep," and his favorite model for explaining universal 
motion was a mechanical orrery.50 Robert Chambers, whose Vestiges 
went through eleven editions between 1844 and 1860 (including a 
cheap fifty-cent American paperback), believed in a universal or 
der so all-encompassing that "man is now seen to be an enigma 
only as an individual; in the mass he is a mathematical problem" 
and all "mental action, being proved to be under law, passes at once 
into the category of natural things."51 Free will, fatalism, and de 
49. Herndon to Bartlett, Oct. 1887, in Hidden Lincoln, ed. Hertz, 209; see also John 
Hill to Herndon, June 6, 1865, which includes Hill's Feb. 15, 1862, article in a Pe 
tersburg, Illinois, newspaper, describing Lincoln's "dissertation," Herndon-Weik 
Papers, Group 4 [reel 7], #118. 
50. Thomas Paine, "Predestination" and "The Age of Reason," in The Writings of 
Thomas Paine, 20 vols., ed. M. D. Conway (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1896), 
4:31, 193, 424-27. 
51. Robert Chambers, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, ed. James A. Sec 
ord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 331. Lincoln also acquired a taste 
for poetry, especially Burns and Shakespeare; and it is worth remembering in this 
context that Burns was read in the early nineteenth century as a religious skeptic, 
while the Shakespeare Lincoln liked best had a strong whiff of fatalism to it. Lin 
coln's comment to the actor James Hackett in 1863 that he preferred the king of Den 
mark's 
"soliloquy in Hamlet commencing 'O, my offence is rank'" to the more cele 
brated "To be, or not to be," is usually treated as an embarrassing but amiable example 
of an amateur's enthusiasm. Not enough interpreters of Lincoln have taken the trouble 
to read the soliloquy (act 3, scene 3) and notice that it speaks in agonizing tones about 
the inability of human beings to choose, on their own, even the most desirable ends: 
O, my offense is rank, it smells to heaven ... 
... what then? what rests? 
Try what repentance can: what can it not? 
Yet what can it when one can not 
repent? 
O wretched state! O bosom black as death! 
O limned soul, that struggling to be free 
Art more engaged! 
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terminism left their tracks throughout Lincoln's reading in the two 
middle decades of his life in Springfield; and the imprint they made 
on Lincoln was deep enough that he appeared in 1849 to Spring 
field Presbyterian pastor James Smith to be "very depressed and 
downcast" and 
"perplexed and unsettled by the fundamentals of 
religion, by speculative difficulties, connected with Providence."52 
But the determinism of Chambers, Volney, and Paine had little 
of the sophistication and none of the specific vocabulary of "mo 
tive" and "self-interest" that Lincoln's fatalism possessed, and 
while they may have helped to de-nature Lincoln's youthful Cal 
vinism and redress it in secularized garb, they certainly could not 
have given it the configuration it assumed in Lincoln's 1846 "Hand 
bill." Instead, the rhetorical clues in Lincoln's fatalism point to a 
source that may lie unsuspectingly close at hand, in the debates 
among American lawyers in the early Republic over the shape of 
a 
republican jurisprudence. 
Lincoln began the practice of law in Springfield in 1837, and like 
most lawyers in the United States outside of major urban centers, 
he acquired his legal education more-or-less on the job as a junior 
partner in an already established law practice (in this case, that of 
John T. Stuart) and through reading a list of basic texts that began 
with the Commentaries of the English jurist, Sir William Blackstone, 
and later included Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story's Commen 
taries.53 Given the recognition that Blackstone's name manages to 
52. James Smith, quoted in Taggart, Faith of Abraham Lincoln, 51; Barton, Soul of 
Abraham Lincoln, 162-63. Another possible "infidel" influence on Lincoln may have 
come in the form of Robert Owen, whose communal experiment at New Harmony, 
Indiana, lay about fifty miles from the Lincolns' Pigeon Creek settlement and only 
ten miles from a parcel of land that Thomas Lincoln bought for speculative purpos 
es in 1827. Owen was a Paine-ite determinist who staged a sensational debate with 
Alexander Campbell in Cincinnati in 1829 in which Owen frankly and skillfully de 
fended a nontheistic determinist position. Years after Lincoln's death, Dennis Hanks 
claimed that Lincoln had visited and admired New Harmony. See Owen, Debate on 
the Evidences of Christianity, 2 vols. (Cincinnati, Oh.: Robinson and Fairbank, 1829), 
1:22-24; E. H. Madden and D. W Madden, "The Great Debate: Alexander Campbell 
versus Robert Owen," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18 (Summer 1982): 
207-26; Warren, Lincoln's Youth, 124,171-72; Van Natter, Lincoln's Boyhood, 118-24. 
53. Lincoln composed a sample reading list in a letter to James T. Thornton on 
Dec. 2,1858 {Collected Works, 3:344) that included, beyond Blackstone, Joseph Chit 
ty's Treatise on Pleading and Parties to Actions 
. .. Containing Precedents of Pleadings, 
and an Appendix of Forms (3 vols., 1844), Simon Greenleaf's Treatise on the Law of Ev 
idence (3 vols., 1842-53), and Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Admin 
istered in England and America (2 vols., 1836) and Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, 
and the Incidents Thereof, According to the Practice of the Courts of Equity, of England 
and America (2d ed., 1840). 
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command even among nonlawyers, it is ironic that his was actual 
ly the most embattled figure on that list, for Blackstone was an 
English Tory whose principal labor had been to establish the su 
premacy of king and common law over natural law and religious 
dissent and to secure the protection and preservation of property 
ownership as the supreme duty of the law.54 Blackstone encoded, 
in effect, many of the notions of sovereignty and property that the 
American revolutionaries had fought to resist. Much of the histo 
ry of American law in the early republic is the story of how Amer 
ican jurists, led by Story and John Marshall, sought to American 
ize and domesticate Blackstone and the English common law and, 
on the other hand, how a pugnacious minority, under the inspira 
tion of the English utilitarians James Mill and Jeremy Bentham, 
struggled to repel the imposition of common law and instead make 
law a matter of positive legislative statute that served the interests, 
not of property holding, but (in Bentham's phrase) of "the great 
est happiness for the greatest number."55 
Although Bentham recruited the support of only a comparatively 
small portion of the American legal profession before the Civil 
War?only Louisiana, which had no previous experience of English 
common law, adopted a Benthamite law code?his attractions were 
not limited to legal theory, for Bentham had also written on meta 
physics, and his comments on free will and necessity have what 
will by now seem a familiar ring. In general, Bentham professed 
54. J. C. D. Clark, The Language of Liberty, 1660-1832: Political Discourse and Social 
Dynamics in the Anglo-American World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univeristy Press, 
1994), 5, 83, 110, 140. 
55. On Blackstone and the struggle to incorporate English common law into 
American jurisprudence, see Gregory S. Alexander, "Time and Property in the Amer 
ican Republican Legal Culture," New York University Law Review 66 (May 1991): 273 
352; Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 9-15; R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Jus 
tice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic (Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1985), 272-73, 280; G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cul 
tural Change, 1815-1835 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 68-71, 95, 119, 
151-52, 489-91, 493, 676-77. On Bentham, see D. B. Crook, "The United States in 
Bentham's Thought," Australian Journal of Politics and History 10 (1964): 196-204; John 
Dinwiddy, Bentham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 55, 85; H. L. A. Hart, 
"The United States of America," in Essays on Bentham: Studies in the Jurisprudence 
and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 53-78; Rogers M. Smith, Liber 
alism and American Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, MA, 
1985), 39. On the "greatest happiness" formula, see Jeremy Bentham, Deontology 
Together with a Table of the Springs of Moral Action, ed. Amnon Goldworth (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983), 60. 
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to be irritated by the need to talk about free will and necessity, al 
though he admitted that any jurisprudence worth its salt had to 
come to terms with these problems if only to have a clear notion 
of what responsibility before the law meant. Bentham's irritation 
grew from his insistence that the entire problem was really quite 
simple: "On every occasion, conduct?the course taken by a man's 
conduct?is at the absolute command of?is the never-failing re 
sult of?the motives." 
It is an acknowledged truth, that every kind of act whatever, 
and consequently every kind of offence, is apt to assume a dif 
ferent character, and to be attended with different effects, ac 
cording to the nature of the motive which gives birth to it. This 
makes it requisite to take a view of the several motives by 
which human conduct is liable to be influenced.56 
What gave these "motives" their power over human willing was, 
precisely as it had been for Lincoln, the self-interest to which they 
appealed: "on every occasion, [an act] is at the absolute command 
of motives and corresponding interest." Thus, every choice?and 
neither Bentham nor Lincoln made any exceptions?was a moti 
vated one, and the fundamental characteristic of human nature to 
which motives played was a plain, bleak concern for one's own 
self-interest. "No human act ever has been or ever can be disinter 
ested," wrote Bentham, "for there exists not ever any voluntary ac 
tion, which is not the result of the operation of some motive or mo 
tives, nor any motive, which has not for its accompaniment a 
corresponding interest, real or imagined."57 
It is hard to miss the extraordinary resemblance between Lin 
coln's and Bentham's descriptions of the operation of motives and 
self-interest. All that is lacking to seal the identification of Ben 
thamite utilitarianism as the ultimate source of Lincoln's fatalism 
would be a cameo appearance by Bentham on the streets of Spring 
field in, say, about 1846. Unhappily, Bentham died in 1832, and al 
though Bentham gave John Quincy Adams twenty-five copies of 
each of his principal writings in 1817 to distribute to "strategic re 
positories" in the United States, there is no evidence that Lincoln 
read them, and no direct citation of Bentham occurs anywhere in 
56. Bentham, Deontology, 112; Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (London: Methuen, 1982), 96; Doug 
las E. Long, Bentham on Liberty: Jeremy Bentham's Idea of Liberty in Relation to His Util 
itarianism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 41, 231. 
57. Bentham, Deontology, 19, 99-100. 
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Lincoln's writings. Still, Lincoln need not have studied Bentham 
to have absorbed him, for Bentham's ideas were available through 
other American lawyers and legal reformers, including Richard 
Hildreth, William Beach Lawrence, Edward Livingston (the author 
of the Benthamite Louisiana law code), the Philadelphia lawyer 
John Allyn, and the Louisiana Supreme Court jurist Henry Carle 
ton.58 The latter two, not coincidentally, also published treatises on 
free will, frankly hawking the Benthamite line on necessity. "Ne 
cessity varies with motive," wrote Carleton, and "when once the 
motive is fixed, it is no less certain in its effects than the forces of 
physical necessity."59 
Lincoln was much too committed to the defense of property 
rights and land tenure to have become an outright utilitarian like 
Allyn, Carleton, or Hildreth. In fact, the only political theorist we 
know Lincoln studied in detail was Francis Wayland, who was the 
mortal enemy of both moral and political utilitarianism, and Lin 
coln's recommended legal reading was anchored to both Blackstone 
and Story.60 But the presence of a mediating utilitarian discourse 
within the American legal profession does remove the obstacle of 
remoteness from Lincoln's recognition of Bentham's musings on 
free will (being a lawyer, in fact, placed Lincoln more directly in 
the track of Bentham than had he been part of any other profes 
sional community). Certainly, one has to say that Lincoln, although 
he won his fame and fortune as the protector of railroad property 
for the Illinois Central in the 1850s, also gave a utilitarian twist to 
the ultimate purpose of property jurisprudence. "The democracy 
of today hold[s] the liberty of one man to be absolutely nothing, 
when in conflict with another man's right of property," wrote Lin 
coln in 1859, "Republicans, on the contrary, are for both the man 
and the dollar; but in cases of conflict, the man before the dollar."61 
58. Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1943), 373-75. 
59. Henry Carleton, Liberty and Necessity; In Which Are Considered the Laws of As 
sociation of Ideas, the Meaning of the Word Will, and the True Intent of Punishment (Phil 
adelphia: Parry and McMillan, 1857), 148; John Allyn, The Philosophy of Mind in Vo 
lition; or, An Essay on the Will (Oberlin, Oh.: J. M. Fitch's Press, 1851), 30, 32, 50, 53-54, 
61, 64. 
60. Olivier Frayss?, Lincoln, Land, and Labor, 1809-60, trans. Sylvia Neely (Urba 
na: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 91-92; Gabor S. Boritt, Lincoln and the Eco 
nomics of the American Dream (1978; Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 121 
52; D. H. Meyer, The Instructed Conscience: The Shaping of the American National Ethic 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), 46-49. 
61. Lincoln, "To Henry L. Pierce and Others," Apr. 6, 1859, in Collected Works, 
3:375; Frassy?, Lincoln, Land, and Labor, 170-71. 
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Even if Benthamite utilitarianism gets no explicit credit from Lin 
coln in his arguments with "one, two or three" about fatalism, we 
cannot dismiss lightly the striking similarity of vocabulary and 
meaning on free will between the Springfield lawyer and the Lon 
don jurist. 
That the sources of Lincoln's "Doctrine of Necessity" could easi 
ly run an intellectual gamut from Calvinistic Baptists to Benthamite 
utilitarianism throws onto Lincoln a differently angled light than that 
in which we have been accustomed to seeing him. Herndon's com 
ments that Lincoln "read less and thought more than any man in 
America"?that 
"politics were his Heaven and his Hades metaphys 
ics"?have usually been read as Herndon's claim that Lincoln was 
a raw, untutored genius, making up in native political intuition what 
he lacked in educated sophistication. But Herndon also described 
Lincoln in reasonably conventional philosophical terms as "a real 
ist as opposed to an idealist... a sensationalist as opposed to an in 
tuitionalist, a materialist as opposed to a spiritualist," and above all, 
a man who "was moved and controlled by his philosophy," what 
ever kind of eclectic shape that "philosophy" may have taken. Lin 
coln's speculations on fatalism indicate that he burrowed deeper into 
the mazes of Anglo-American intellectual life in the nineteenth cen 
tury?through the competing Springfield lyceums, the religious 
conflicts of predestination and perfection, and the distribution net 
works of books and the culture of print in the trans-Appalachia be 
fore 1860?than his interpreters have given him credit. Even grant 
ing that Lincoln's intellectual life was dominated by questions of 
politics and law, it was not always simple politics or simple law, and 
the next biographer of Lincoln is going to have to pay far closer at 
tention than has been the habit (especially since J. G. Randall) to the 
bits of cultural substance that lie scattered and unsystemized 
throughout Lincoln's surviving writings.62 
Lincoln's speculations on fatalism and necessity also throw a 
different light on one of Lincoln's most-admired attributes, his 
"charity for all" and his "malice toward none," from the defeated 
Confederate leadership down to the sentry caught asleep on duty. 
Lincoln interpreters have been tempted to ascribe this "charity" to 
a 
mysterious, godlike reservoir of virtue in Lincoln; but Herndon 
62. Herndon, "Analysis of the Character," Abraham Lincoln Quarterly 1 (Sept. 1941) 
and (Dec. 1941): 364, 411; Herndon to Weik, Nov. 24, 1882, in Hidden Lincoln, ed. 
Hertz, 90-91; Rufus Rockwell Wilson, What Lincoln Read (Washington, DC: National 
Capital Press, 1932), 51-53. 
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knew better?and knew that it was closely linked to Lincoln's fa 
talism. "Lincoln's patience sprang from his philosophy," Herndon 
explained, "his charity for men and his want of malice for them 
everywhere, all grew out of his peculiar philosophy." Since Lin 
coln was a 
"thorough fatalist" and "believed that what was to be 
would be, and no prayers of ours could arrest or reverse the de 
cree," then "men were but simple tools of fate, of conditions, and 
of laws," and no one "was responsible for what he was, thought, 
or did, because he was a child of conditions."63 
This does not, at first blush, seem like a very congenial attitude 
for a case lawyer like Lincoln to adopt, but it is worth noting that 
this was a problem that Bentham and the utilitarians had addressed 
by redefining the connection between responsibility and punish 
ment by abandoning all idea of legal punishment for crimes as re 
tributive justice and reconceiving imprisonment as an opportuni 
ty for moral exhortation and rehabilitation.64 Punishment, wrote the 
American Benthamite John Allyn, should not be "an expression of 
hatred, but a means of exciting in the mind of the delinquent a 
motive to do right, and thereby... remedying his deficient moral 
state."65 Laws should therefore be "remedial" rather than retribu 
tive according to the utilitarians. Indeed, Bentham's most well 
known proposals for legal reform addressed the reconstruction of 
the English penal system, including the architecture of prisons, to 
promote penitence rather than to inflict pain.66 Not surprisingly, 
Lincoln often took the same line of argument in asking for the re 
vision of sentences for wartime criminals. "Five years at hard la 
bor in the Penitentiary is not at all necessary to prevent the repeti 
tion of the crime by himself and others," wrote Lincoln in remitting 
the sentence of William Yocum in 1864, and the pertinent thing to 
note in that judgment was Lincoln's conviction that the purpose 
of punishment was not to even scores but, in good utilitarian fash 
ion, to present a sufficient motive to deter repetition or imitation.67 
63. Herndon to Weik, Feb. 25, 1887, Herndon-Weik Papers, Group 4 [reel 9], 
#1893-96; Herndon to Fowler, Feb. 18, 1886, and to Weik, Feb. 26, 1891, in Hidden 
Lincoln, ed. Hertz, 141-42, 266-67. 
64. Richard Double, The Non-Reality of Free-Will (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 134-37; Christopher Lasch, "Guilt," Intellectual History Newsletter 16 
(Dec. 1994): 15-17. 
65. Allyn, Philosophy of Mind, 99. 
66. Carleton, Liberty and Necessity, 161; William Holdsworth, The History of English 
Law, 2 vols. (London: Methuen, 1935), 11:137; Melvin I. Urofsky, A March of Liberty: A 
Constitutional History of the United States (New York: Knopf, 1988), 308, 313. 
67. Lincoln, "To Edwin M. Stanton," Mar. 18, 1864, in Collected Works, 7:257. 
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Otherwise, Lincoln shrank from objective assessments of respon 
sibility, because, to the extent that necessity was irresistible, human 
efforts to oppose it or flee from it were fruitless. In 1854, he had 
remarked that southern slaveholders "were neither better, nor 
worse than we of the North" because "if we were situated as they 
are, we should act and feel as they do; and if they were situated 
as we are, they should act and feel as we do; and we never ought 
to lose sight of this fact in discussing the subject."68 Later, when 
reviewing the appeals of deserters, Lincoln liked to discover ne 
cessity in a case, rather than the sentimental application of pity, as 
the grounds for granting a pardon. "Well, after all, Judge, I think I 
must put this with my leg cases," Lincoln remarked on one occa 
sion to Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt: "They are the cases 
that you call by that long title, 'cowardice in the face of the ene 
my,' but I call them for short, my Teg cases.' But I put it to you, 
and I leave it for you to decide for yourself: if Almighty God gives 
a man a 
cowardly pair of legs how can he help their running away 
with him?"69 "This philosophy as a whole will account for much 
of the facts and laws of his splendid life," promised Herndon, and 
that promise may also include Lincoln's most eloquent statement 
on the meaning of responsibility, in the third paragraph of the sec 
ond inaugural. 
Almost by custom, the attention commentators devote to the sec 
ond inaugural is drawn largely to the final paragraph, with its 
benediction-like exhortation to end the Civil War "with malice to 
ward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God 
gives us to see the right." What is frequently missed is how, in the 
preceding paragraph, Lincoln had expressed grave reservations 
about how much of the right God had actually given people to see. 
Even though the Confederate cause had been dedicated to a pal 
pable injustice?that of "wringing their bread from the sweat of 
other men's faces"?even this injustice had been part of "the Al 
mighty's purposes," and Lincoln was loath to pass too severe a 
judgment of his own on southerners when it was those purposes 
that were the ultimate cause of their misdoings. Much as he might 
pray "that this mighty scourge of war might pass away," Lincoln 
could not escape the sense of necessity in the four years of blood 
shed, that the war was something that "God wills to continue." 
Faced with the inscrutability of that necessity, Lincoln warned, "let 
68. Lincoln, "Speech at Bloomington, Illinois," Sept. 12, 1854, in Collected Works, 
3:230. 
69. Current, Lincoln Nobody Knows, 165-66. 
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us judge not that we be not judged" in dealing with each other; 
and let us not judge God, whose mysterious purposes are still, 
above any human willing or judgment, "true and righteous alto 
gether." This is not so much a declaration of forgiveness as it is an 
acquiescence in the face of a "necessity" that forbids the imputa 
tion of too much praise or blame. Even at the end, Lincoln's fatal 
ism had managed to have the last word. 
Yet, Lincoln the "fatalist," who had no assurance that the will of 
any person was free, is also the great giver of liberty?the emanci 
pator of millions?and the rebuilder of a sundered republic. There 
is no greater paradox in Lincoln's life than the one arising from 
the juxtaposition of these two images, for there seems no easy way 
to reconcile the man who believed that all human action was de 
cided by powers beyond human control and the president who re 
iterated his faith in the capacity of individuals to improve them 
selves via a free-labor system that "gives hope to all, and energy, 
and progress, and improvement of condition to all."70 Unhappily, 
paradoxes tempt the curious to resolve them into their separate 
parts; in Lincoln's case, the paradox of the Great Emancipator and 
the Fatalist has more significance for us if we leave it standing and 
ask what purpose the paradox might have served. In the most gen 
eral sense, the paradox of Lincoln's fatalism falls into a pattern that 
has reappeared throughout modern Western history, and it arises 
from the peculiar tendency of determinists, from Oliver Cromwell 
to Karl Marx, to preach divine or material inevitability at one mo 
ment and then turn into the most avowed revolutionary activists 
at the next. The significance of Lincoln's paradox may be, in that 
light, that doctrines of necessity possess a strange psychological 
dynamic of their own, one that ironically promotes action rather 
than passivity, construction rather than indolence, persistence rath 
er than hopelessness. And in Lincoln's American context, the need 
to preserve a sense of paradox about necessity and choice was, as 
Jon Pahl and Michael K?mmen have suggested, a necessary part 
of the building of "a new and distinctive culture or ethos" in Amer 
ica.71 K?mmen notes that Americans, faced with the overwhelm 
ing challenge of subduing a new continent and establishing a new 
republic, could find the resolve to confront that challenge only by 
70. Gabor S. Boritt, "The Right to Rise," in The Public and Private Lincoln: Con 
temporary Perspectives, ed. Cullom Davis et al. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Uni 
versity Press, 1979), 57-70; Lincoln, Collected Works, 3:478-79. 
71. Pahl, Paradox Lost, 167-70; Michael K?mmen, People of Paradox: An Inquiry 
Concerning the Origins of American Civilization (New York: Knopf, 1973), 32-47. 
This content downloaded from 138.234.152.108 on Fri, 21 Mar 2014 12:19:35 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
80 Abraham Lincoln and the Doctrine of Necessity 
simultaneously asserting a divine Providence that would assure 
their triumph and a "hope in human striving" that would give them 
the incentive to strive in the first place. In that context, it was pre 
cisely Lincoln's embrace of paradox?of both "necessity" and the 
"right to rise"?that granted him both the deterministic stability 
and the self-willed initiative to save the republic from the greatest 
challenge it would face. 
But the paradox of Lincoln's fatalism may also be linked, in a 
more paradoxical way, to a subtler change in Western conscious 
ness in the nineteenth century. The Rice University historian Thom 
as Haskell, in a celebrated debate in 1985 and 1987 with David Bri 
on Davis and John Ashworth, asked his readers to see a linkage 
between the rise of market capitalism in the Atlantic world in the 
nineteenth century and the simultaneous rise of humanitarianism, 
especially in the form of antislavery. Haskell reasoned that capi 
talism taught people, for the first time in Western history, to look 
beyond short-term gains and losses and to "attend to the remote 
consequences of their actions." Capitalism, in other words, expand 
ed the horizons of trade and with it forced the traders to widen 
their mental horizons, in terms of both geography (treating the 
world as the market rather than just the village down the lane) and 
time (calculating long-term gains and long-term patterns in mar 
keting); this, in turn, created an extraordinary expansion of what 
people conceived themselves capable of doing and "inspired peo 
ple's confidence in their power to intervene in the course of 
events."72 In Haskell's view, this expansion of possibilities had par 
ticular application to the antislavery movement, since it was pre 
cisely this new confidence of power, and the new awareness of a 
larger world of problems to use that power on, that explained for 
Haskell why no one before 1760 seemed to have felt that slavery 
was a problem they could or should address and why after 1760 
so many people abruptly changed that opinion. 
By that reckoning, no one ought to emerge as a better example 
of this consciousness than Lincoln, especially since his career as a 
Whig lawyer so often served the interests of an expanding Ameri 
can market system. But Lincoln's fatalism points toward exactly the 
opposite form of consciousness, toward a sense of increased re 
straint and futility in the face of invisible powers over which one 
72. Haskell, "Capitalism and Humanitarian Sensibility, 2," in The Antislavery De 
bate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation, ed. Thomas 
Bender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 141, 148. 
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has no meaningful control. To an observer like Lincoln, the dra 
matically expanding commercial economy, with its impersonal con 
nections, with strangers bidding prices on distant markets, with 
railroads bringing goods and immigrants from heretofore unimag 
inable distances, was just as likely to be a reminder of how little 
could be ascribed to individual human willing and how much to 
the power of "interest." In Lincoln's case, the expansion of hori 
zons described by Haskell could not dispel a contradictory sense 
of inability, of what could not be achieved; even the preoccupation 
of 
"promise-keeping," which Haskell selected as a prime charac 
teristic of the new market consciousness (and which is incarnated 
in Lincoln's fabulous reputation for scrupulous honesty), has to sit 
uneasily beside Lincoln's effacement of moral responsibility in the 
face of "motives." 
So once again, Lincoln presents us with paradox. For Lincoln, the 
expansion of America and the abolition of slavery would certainly 
give "hope to all." But as Americans rose to meet the moral chal 
lenge of slavery, they would have to learn the humbling lesson of 
"fatalism," that moralism does not come unmixed with motives and 
self-interest; and as America grew in commercial power and strength 
across the continent, that growth would sooner or later bring Amer 
icans to the kind of conceptual and economic boundaries on growth 
that no one can supersede. Not for Lincoln would there be the 
straightforward acceptance of a world of new horizons but rather a 
complex struggle to assimilate the expansion of what could be ac 
complished with the diminution of what one could be responsible 
for. His antislavery convictions may have less to do with embrac 
ing the new consciousness of the market than with an ambivalent 
effort to contain it. He did not live to see how futile that effort would 
have been in the Gilded Age, but perhaps that would not, in the end, 
have greatly shocked a "fatalist" like Lincoln. Why should the spirit 
of mortal be proud, Lincoln asked, in reciting his favorite poem, and 
why should it expect to accomplish more than the purposes of the 
Almighty had laid down for it? Perhaps that realization, more than 
any other single factor, left him no other explanation for human ac 
tion but the "Doctrine of Necessity." 
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